时间：2016/05/23，9:30-11:00

地点：伟德betvlctor1946一楼院史馆

主讲人:Bram Cadsby

主讲题目:The Impact of Risk Aversion and Stress on the Incentive Effect of Performance Pay

主讲人介绍: Bram Cadsby博士为加拿大 University of Guelph 终身教授。本科毕业于伦敦伟德betvlctor1946，在美国MIT获得经济学博士学位。曾在欧美多个大学任教和访问，担任多个国际顶级学术期刊的匿名审稿人，是加拿大人文与社会科学研究委员会评审专家。

内容摘要：We demonstrate in a laboratory experiment that the effectiveness of performance-contingent incentives is inversely related to risk-aversion levels. For about 14% of participants, performance fails to improve under performance pay, and the probability of such deterioration increases with risk aversion. This phenomenon works in part through the reduced effort level of more risk-averse individuals when effort level is positively correlated with risk exposure. It is also associated with higher self-reported levels of stress by more risk-averse people working under performance-contingent pay. We find no evidence of such stress causing decrements in the quality of effort affecting performance after controlling for effort level. However, controlling for effort, more risk-averse participants perform better under a fixed salary, leaving less room for improvement under performance pay.